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I 
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GENEVE P. ARRINGTON, 
Defendants' and Appellants.: 
Case No. 11379 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
An Appeal From the Judgment of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
lll.AN D. FRANDSEN 
1
!43 South State Street 
lalt Lake City Utah 
I ' 
t . ttorney for Respondent 
RIOIARD L. YOUNG 
Salt Lake County Bar 
Legal Services, Inc. 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought action upon a uniform real estate 
ntract, electing to treat said contract as a note and 
rtgage and seeking foreclosure of defendants' interests 
llie subject property; defendants answered, denying 
~terial allegations of the complaint and asserting 
t
, veral affirmative defenses, and also counterclaimed 
imst plaintiff for damages and for specific performance 
1
'. said contract. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW 
The trial court granted swnrnary judgment in favor of 
iPJaintiff and against defendants. 
i 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek reversal of said summary 
,judgment, with instructions to dismiss respondent's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiff commenced the instant action by filing an 
unverified complaint, signed by counsel for plaintiff. (R.1-2) 
Tue complaint was subsequently served upon defendantso (R.3-4 
The complaint seeks foreclosure of defendants' interests 
in their home, which was sold to them and to one George 
idward Peacock, as joint tenants, under a certain real 
estate contract dated January 20, 1965, with plaintiff's 
assignors, Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher, his wife. 
IR, 8) In addition to plaintiff's request for foreclosure 
mdsale of defendants' interests in the subject property, 
Plaintiff prays for an adjudication of the total amount owing 
oy defendants to. plaintiff Under the contract (including 
attorney fees and costs of suit) and for a deficiency 
:udgment, if appropriate. (R. 2) 
Although the joint tenancy of George Edward Peacock 
~the subject property clearly appears on the face of the 
:e01 estate contract in question (R. 8), plaintiff did not 
t'!Irie Mc. Peacock as a party defendant (R. 1) and plaintiff 
-2-
i:oS made no effort to join said joint tenant, al though such 
ljoinder would have been and is possible. (R. 13) The 
I subject real property is situate in Salt Lake County, where 
the instant action was corrunenced. (R. 8) 
Defendants engaged the services of present counsel of 
:ecord, who subsequently served and filed a notice of 
ippearance. (R. 5) 
I 
Thereafter, without requesting an answer or otherwise 
icorrununicating with counsel for defendants, plaintiff served 
jwdfiled a motion for surrunary judgment. (R. 6) Said motion 
lasked for a money judgment against defendants in the followins 
I 
I 
! arounts: 
$12,420.44 principal 
$ 1,082.97 interest and property tax 
$ 19.80 court costs 
$ 2,000.00 attorney fees (R. 6) 
Plaintiff's motion for surrunary judgment was based upon 
the following papers, according to plaintiff ( R. 6-7): 
(a) a photocopy of the aforesaid real estate contract 
: ~ ' 
·cetween plaintiff's assignor, as vendor, and the defendants 
1'1'i Mr. Peacock, as joint vendees (R. 8); 
(b) a photocopy of an assignment of the vendor's 
bteres t in the subject property to plaintiff, which assign-
'nt cc.'rrectly names the vendees as being "Mathew c. 
A,rington and Geneve P. Arrington and George Edward 
-3-
:f2acock" (R. 9); 
I 
I 
(c) a photocopy of a demand lette~ sent by plaintiff 
lw defendants (R. 10); 
i 
! 
I 
(d) an affidavit by one Jon Brown, not made on 
iwsonal knowledge, asserting that there was due and owing 
I 
I 
ity defendants under the subject real estate contract "the 
! 
i:'.im of $13,503.41 consisting of $12,420.44 principal as of 
I 
ljune, 1967 and interest from June 20, 1967 to August 1, 1968, 
I 
!:nthe amount of $799.18 and property tax of $283.79" (R. 11) 
I 
rnd 
(e) the court file, which for purposes of the summary 
Judgment motion then consisted only of plaintiff's unverified· 
1:omplaint. (R. 1-2) 
Prior to the original date set for the hearing on 
;lain tiff's motion for summary judgment, defendants served 
'lpon counsel for plaintiff their Answer and Counterclaim 
!R, 13-16), the _answer~ and statements of which were sworn 
to by defendant Mathew c. Arrington on his own personal 
rr1owledge. (R. 15) 
Defendants' Answer unequivocally denied paragraphs 
i, 4 and 5 of plaintiff's compla:int, directly controverting 
;,! sworn testimony, on the personal knowledge of defendant 
':Jthew c. Arrington, the unsworn allegations of plaintiff 
:egarding the following material issues of fact: 
_/1_ 
(1) whether defendants were in default under the terms 
~ che subject real estate contract; 
(2) whether there was then due and owing on said 
~ntract to plaintiff from defendants the principal sum of 
112,420.44, together with interest; and 
(3) whether plaintiff was entitled to $1,458.00 as a 
~easonable attorney's fee. (R. 1-2, 13) 
In their Answer, defendants also asserted two affirmative 
~efenses: 
I 
(1) that plaintiff had failed to join an indispensable 
~arty, narnel y, George Edward Peacock ( R. 13 ) ; and 
(2) that plaintiff was not a real party in interest, for 
ithe reason that by May, 1967, plaintiff (or its assignor) had 
~en fully paid its equity in the subject property and should 
have conveyed title to defendants as required by the terms 
1of the uniform real estate contract in question. (R. 13-14) 
I 
I In their Counterc~aim, defendants alleged three causes 
10f action against plaintiff: 
(1) that at some time prior to June, 1967, defendants 
1:1ad paid the contract balance down to the mortgage balance, 
Entitling defendants to specific performance of plaintiff's 
obligation to convey title to defendants under paragraphs 
: illld 8 of said contract (R. 8, 14, 15); 
( 2) that following the aforesaid failure of plaintiff 
-5-
.. 
tr convey title to defendants, the plaintiff wrongfully 
rortinued to receive payments from defendants to which 
I" 
I plaintiff was not entitled, thereby entitling defendants to 
icoCTiptnsatory damages (R. 14, 15); and 
(3) that plaintiff acted wilfully and maliciously in 
continuing to receive said payments from defendants after 
plaintiff had no equity in the subject real property, 
;entl tling defendants to punitive damages. (R. 14-15) 
On August 1, 1968, the original date set for the 
lmrnmary judgment hearing, defendants served upon counsel 
lfor plaintiff their motion to dismiss for failure to join 
/anindispensable party. (R. 12) On the same date, said 
I 
':,ming was continued until August 20, 1968, at the request 
'Of counsel for plaintiff. (R. 6) 
On August 8, 1968, plaintiff served and filed a motion 
!for appointment of a receiver (R. 20) and a Reply to Counter-
:iaim of defendants. (R. 18) 
In its Reply to Counterclaim of defendants, plaintiff: 
(1) generally denied all allegations in defendants' 
tiirst Cause of Action; 
(2) generally denied all allegations in defendants' 
:~cond Cause of Action; 
(3) failed to respond in any way to defendants' Third 
: :iuse of Action; 
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(4} failed to respond in any way to defendants' First 
~ffirmative Defense; and 
(5} failed to respond in any way to defendants' Second 
l 
11.ffirmative Defense. (R. 18) 
· As of August 8, 1968, all of the pleadings and other 
1
papers hereinabove mentioned were on file in the instant 
[action. (R. 1-18) 
! 
On August 20, 1968, heard arguments of both parties 
jwith respect to plaintiff's motions for appointment of a 
receiver and for summary judgment, and with respect to 
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to join an indis-
pensable party. (R. 28) Both parties' motions were based 
upon the aforementioned pleadings and papers on file as of 
August 8, 1968, and in fact no further filings were made 
until August 2 7, 1968, a week after the hearing. 
On August 27, 1968, two rather incongruous documents 
•ere simultaneously filed: 
(1) the summary judgment from which the instant appeal 
'is taken (R. 28-29); and 
I ( 2) plaintiff's "Motion to determine the amount of 
1._, ff 1 .. erendants' indebtedness, entry of decree o orec osure 
1~d notice." (R. 22-23) 
In addition to denying defendants' motion to dismiss 
: for failure to join an indispensable party (R. 28), the 
I l -7-
,~11nary judgment entered by the court below reads in 
rertinent part as follows: 
I "NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the 
motion for swnrnary judgment, judgment is 
hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendants, the amount of said in-
debtedness will be determined by the 
attorneys for the parties or by a subse-
quent motion •••• " (R. 28) 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment did not purport 
i 
!to seek only a partial judgment (R. 6), and the trial court 
jdid not purport to make "an order specifying the facts that 
I 
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent 
to '•lhich the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
i 
lcontroversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just," as contemplated by Rule 56 (d). On the 
! 
;record before it, the trial court simply entered judgment 
"in favor of plaintiff and against defendants," thereby 
I 
idjudicating all issues of fact and law raised by the 
/record before the; court.: 
I 
Paradoxically, while purporting to adjudicate all issues 
odversely to defendants, the trial court's judgment added 
! . 
l:r11t "the amount of said indebtedness will be determined 
'ty the attorneys for the parties or by a subsequent motion" 
;, 2Hl-- despite the fact that plaintiff's swnrnary judgment 
· •tion had been addressed solely to that factual issue: 
-8-
I 
i 
"Plaintiff moves for summary judgment pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount 
of $12,420044 principal, $1,082097 interest and 
property tax (from and including June 20, 1967, 
to and including August 1, 1968) $19.80 court 
costs, and attorney fees of $2,000.00 in this 
matter for the reason and upon the grounds as 
follows •••• " (R.6) 
As indicated above, on the same day that the court 
relow entered summary judgment against defendants, the 
flaintiff filed an ingenious motion, apparently designed 
I 
!to resolve several genuine issues of material fact which 
i 
~ad not been resolved by the summary judgment, without the 
inconvenience of a trial : 
"Plaintiff above named, by and through its 
attorney, Alan D. Frandsen, hereby moves the 
Court to find the defendants indebted to the 
plaintiff in the amount of $12,420.44 principal, 
$1,082.97 interest and property tax (interest 
and property tax is computed from and including 
June 20, 1967, to and including August 1, 1968), 
$19.80 court costs and $2,000.00 attorney fees, 
said amount of indebtedness is set forth by the 
plaintiff in its affidavit on file herein. 
Plaintiff seeks a decree of foreclosure for the 
amount of said indebtedness." CR. 22) 
On August 30, 1968, defendants filed a jury demand. 
l'H, 25) On September 3, 1968, defendants filed an affidavit 
/:r,apposition to plaintiff's post-judgment motion, pointing 
I 
I 
!Q't that defendants had a constitutional right to trial by 
I 
I 
i]Ury and reiterating defendants' prior, sworn testimony 
1 •~1 ich had placed in question essentially all material facts 
~ged by plaintiff in the instant action. CR. 26-27) 
On September 13, 1968, defendants timely filed their 
notice of appeal from the court below to. this Court (R. 32), 
together with their designation of record of appeal (R. 31) 
ind certificate of nonreliance on transcript of evidence. 
(R, 30) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOlYr JURISDICTION TO 
ENTER JUDGMENT OF FORE°-'OSURE AGAINST APPELLANTS 
WHERE IT WAS A MATTER OF RECORD THAT RESPONDENT 
HAD FAILED TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, A 
JOINT OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that "persons having a joint interest shall be made parties • 
II '. 
As is apparent on the face of the real estate contract 
under which plaintiff-respondent brought the instant fore-
closure action, the defendants-appellants hold the subject 
.real property in· joint tenancy with one George Edward 
Peacock. Obviously, Mr. Peacock must be joined in the 
: instant action, as required by the express mandate of 
I 
/Rule 19. 
I 
Rule 19 is declaratory of the rule of joinder of parties 
'::hich has long been established in Utah. This Court has 
. clearly held that in a foreclosure action, the trial court 
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0,ust require joinder of. all known owners of the subject 
: prciµerty. Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co., 94 u. 134, 76 P.2d 
I 
' 
I 234 ( 19 38) • Accord: Mickel son v. Anderson, 81 U. 444, 19 
i 
iP.2dl033 (1932). Cf. Garner v. Anderson, 67 u. 553, 248 
Pac. 496 (1926); Palle v. Industrial Corrun'n, 79 u. 47, 7 P.2d 
284 (1929); Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 U.2d 196, 356 P.2d 63] 
' (1960). 
I 
As this Court pointed out in Hoyt, the joinder require-
ment is especially pertinent in a foreclosure proceedings, 
for the reason that failure to determine all outstanding 
interests in the subject property must inevitably depress 
the price offered by bidders at a sheriff's sale of the 
property, thereby depriving the judgment debtor of a fair 
i liquidation of his interest in the property. 
Further, respondent cannot be heard to complain of 
• any jurisdictional difficulties in joining Mr. Peacock as 
/a party defendant, because in rem or quasi-in rem juris-
diction is obviously supplied by the situs of the subject 
real property within the territorial jursidiction of the 
court below. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST APPELLANTS WHERE THERE REMAINED SEVERAL 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED. 
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(a) The judgment entered below can only be viewed 
as purporting to adjudicate all issues raised 
by the pleadings. 
This Court may well be tempted to try to make some sense 
out of the confusion below, by treating the judgment unde.i;-
review as if it were a partial summary judgment. However, 
the record simply will not sustain such a construction of 
the lower court's action. I. 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment obviously was 
not intended to seek only a partial adjudication but was 
. ! 
calculated to obtain a final adjudication of all issues 
in the case. 
Similarly, the trial court's judgment--made "in 
nccordance with the motion for summary judgment"--in no 
i way complies with the requirements of Rule 56(d), regarding 
cases not fully adjudicated on motion. The court did not 
even attempt to make "an order specifying the facts that 
appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief 
is not in controversy," as required by Rule 56 ( d) • True, 
the court did append a legally meaningless direction that 
the parties determine certain unresolved issues of fact 
'b}' the attorneys for the parties or by a subsequent 
'" 0 t1.on" (R 0 28), but the operative portion of the summary 
iudc:Jll1ent clearly stated that "judgment is hereby entered 
L -12-
, in favor of plaintiff and against defendants • 0 • o" (R. 28) 
'.~nn the record before the trial court, that judgment 
necessarily resolved all issues theretofore raised by the 
' porties favorably to respondent and unfavorably to appellants. 
Therefore, the judgment here under review can only be 
viewed as purporting to adjudicate all issues raised by the 
: pleadings and other papers of record as of August 8, 1968, 
which was the last date of filing of such pleadings and 
other papers and which was more than 10 days in advance 
of the surrunary judgment hearing. 
(b) Respondent failed properly to support its 
summary judgment motion as to any fact 
alleged in its complaint. 
The only sworn statement submitted by respondent in 
support of its motion for summary judgment was the affidavit 
of Jon Brown (R. 11), which: (1) was not made upon personal 
knowledge, as required by Rule 56(e); and (2) asserted only 
that a certain amount of money was due and owing from 
appellants. Said affidavit did not assert that appellants 
were in default, nor did it deal with any other issue in 
t-he instant case. 
Aside from said affidavit, the only support for 
:espc,ndent 1 s summary judgment motion consists in the 
uns111orn, unverified allegations of respondent's complaint. 
(R. 1-2) 
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(c) Appellants properly supported their defenses 
and counterclaims by sworn statements made 
upon personal knowledge. 
Against the insufficiently supported allegations of 
respondent, appellants placed in the record below their 
sworn denials upon personal knowledge of essentially all 
material facts alleged by respondent. (R. 13, 15) 
In addition to their direct, sworn contravention of 
respondent's material allegations, the appellants countered 
: with affirmative defenses and counterclaims which were sworn 
i 
~to under oath and upon personal knowledge, pursuant to Rule 
56(e). (R. 13-15) 
As this Court has observed, Engstrom v. Bushnell, 
20 u. ?d 250, 436 P.2d 806, 809 (1968) (Justice Ellett, 
dissenting) , an answer and counterclaim sworn to by one 
defendant upon personal knowledge is to be considered as 
an affidavit for purposes of a Rule 56 motion. Williams 
v. Kolb, 145 F.2d 344 (D.C~ Cir. 1944); Fletcher v. 
~folk Newspapers, 239 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1956). 
Even if appellants' verified answer and counterclaim 
i:ete not compliant with Rule 56(e), the most favorable view 
Df the record from respondent 1 s standpoint would be that 
'.l:i· record reveals a direct conflict between unsupported 
3llegations on both sides as to the merits of respondent's 
complaint. Clearly, then, on any view of the record, 
... -14-
there exist genuine issues of fact which preclude a summary 
judgment. If there were ever any legitimate reason to 
1 doubt that, such doubt was removed when respondent made its 
, post-judgment motion to determine the amount of indebtedness 
(R, 22-23) -- the only question of fact which had been 
submitted under oath by respondent to the trial court 
in support of respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
j 
Thus, by making such a post-judgment motion, respondent 
tactitly admitted that the trial court had not properly 
l determined even the single factual issue sworn to by 
respondent. Indeed, after said post-judgment motion was 
denied, the respondent compounded the confusion by giving 
r1otice of trial setting (R. 34) on the same day that 
' appellants gave notice of appeal to this Court. (R. 32) 
(d) Respondent failed to respond in any way 
to certain of appellants' defenses and 
counterclaims. 
As pointed out heFeinabove in our Statement of the 
, Case,· respondent made absolutely no response to either of 
appellants' two affirmative defenses or to appellants' Third 
Cause of Action. 
This Court has squarely held that, where no reply has 
~i:en made to an affirmative defense which would defeat the 
· ~JUse of action, it is the duty of the trial court to grant 
i judgment in accordance with the affirmative defense. 
-15-
libarri v. Christenson, 2 U.2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (1954). 
CONCT,USION 
We believe it is clear that, at the very least, 
ppellants are entitled to a reversal of the summary 
udgment entered by the court below, there being unresolved 
.everal genuine issues of material fact--both with respect 
prespondent's complaint, and with respect to the affirm-
1tive defenses and counterclaims asserted by appellants 
l!lder oath and upon personal knowledge. Further, appellants 
ire entitled to dismissal of respondent's complaint 
iecause of respondent's failure to join an ir:i.dispensable 
larty. We therefore ask this Court to vacate the judgment 
lf the court below, with instructions to dismiss respondent's 
:ompla.int and to maintain jurisdiction as to appellants' 
:ounterclaims. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BAR 
LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By: Richard L. Young 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
